

Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A03050010040-8

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<input type="checkbox"/>	ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/>	DIRECT REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/>	PREPARE REPLY
<input type="checkbox"/>	APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/>	DISPATCH	<input type="checkbox"/>	RECOMMENDATION
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Wednesday 25 January 1978 CG NIDC 78/020C

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
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
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
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


EGYPT: Negotiating Tactics

 Egyptian President Sadat appears in no hurry to resume talks with Israel, preferring for the moment to keep alive the threat--implicit in his dramatic action last week, when he recalled his delegation from Jerusalem--that negotiations will fail unless Israel and the US modify their positions and approaches to the peace process. Timing is all-important to Sadat now; he must decide when he has secured maximum advantage from the current standstill in talks, yet he must be careful that the situation does not deteriorate into a permanent breakdown.

 Two senior Foreign Ministry officials in comments to a US Embassy official yesterday separately repeated the line that Egyptian leaders do not yet think the time is right to soften the Egyptian stance and resume talks. Both officials--who participated in negotiations with Israel--said they saw little value in reconvening either the political or military committees until basic changes take place in Israel's approach.

 Both said the break in talks with Israel came because Sadat finally concluded that Israel wanted to retain Egyptian territory and because the US--at Jerusalem--did not support the Egyptian position but instead continued its role of "honest broker." Both added their voices to the now-familiar refrain coming from Egypt that the outcome of Sadat's peace initiative rests with the US.

 The officials added a new thought, which may have been intended to intensify the pressure on the US. Both asserted that Egypt's acceptance of Israel as a Middle East state and its concessions on the nature of peace were not irrevocable.

These concessions could be withdrawn or, at a minimum, publicly described as major concessions that Egypt had been willing to make only in return for comparable major concessions from Israel on territory and Palestinian self-determination. [REDACTED]

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